This is one of the best history books I’ve read; tons of evidence paired with strong analysis that provides a great framework for understanding West Bengal’s United Front (UF) government, and it’s also just really fun to read. I was initially skeptical of a 300 page book on a time span of just three years, but this book proved that the UF government witnessed enough chaos for its story to fill well over 300 pages. The strongest point of this book is its immense educational value. Before reading this book, I was only dimly aware of the UF as a shaky coalition between the Bangla Congress, CPIM, and other left parties, plagued by the wave of violence sparked by Naxalbari, CPIM’s own political violence, and the UF giving workers an implicit invitation to gherao factory managers. Ghosh’s book strengthened my understanding of these key issues and introduced me to many others I was unaware of: Jyoti Basu’s misuse of the police for political purposes, the infighting and chaotic deal-making between UF constituents, the UF’s support for extrajudicial occupation of benami land, and more. Apart from highlighting the key issues of the UF government, it’s also useful as a chronological, blow-by-blow account of how the UF both rose and fell (twice) as a result of its infighting and poor governance. Anyone seeking to understand West Bengal’s history or the roots of its current problems would benefit from reading this book, as well as people just interested in a fascinating story with lots of food for thought.
I was impressed by the large amount of evidence presented by Ghosh, much of which would be difficult to find today through Google searches or even searching archived newspapers or government records (often poorly kept). He frequently cited incidents of violence or political controversy of which little record exists online apart from brief mentions in archived minutes of Rajya Sabha debates, making the book a brilliant feat of documenting history that would otherwise disappear from public record and memory. The incidents he cited were also just fascinating to read about, often reading more like narrative fiction than the dense history book this appears to be: stories of comical blunders committed by long-gone parties like the Bolshevik Party and Revolutionary Communist Party of India (RCPI), leading to more party splits and political chaos; cases of rioting and violence that reveal the complete collapse of law and order under the UF, while also told in such a gripping way that it’s addictive to read; and a talent for guessing which stories will best prove his argument while also entertaining readers, such as an incident in which the first UF Labor Minister Subodh Banerjee (the progenitor of the gherao) was himself gherao’ed. Ghosh makes great use of these 300 pages to introduce all the key events on the timeline of UF rule and also highlight lesser-known incidents that are demonstrative of larger problems. By the end of the book, you have a much clearer picture of what life was like amidst the violence and disorder of these 3 years. Even beyond its other intellectual merits, this book is commendable as an aid to immersion in a particular time and place.
Apart from the narrative-style evidence consisting of reports on events and happenings, Ghosh also makes excellent use of tables and numbers that highlight the economic problems of Bengal under the UF, e.g. a table showing the number of work stoppages, men involved, and man-days lost in Bengal every year from 1960 to 1969, or a comparison of what percent of ICICI and IFC assistance went to Bengal versus different states, or a table showing per capita central government assistance to different states under the economic plans dating from 1956 to 1968. In other words, it’s an economics-enthusiast’s paradise. Many of these numbers would be hard to find anywhere else without being a professional historian who would get paid to spend hours searching through ancient government records.
The wealth of narrative-style evidence and numerical evidence lends a high degree of credibility to Ghosh’s arguments. His strong analytical skills further strengthen the book: clear thinking and an ability to synthesize dozens of events and tables into an overarching narrative of how structural faults in the UF made it dead on arrival. He identifies trends and fundamental problems that help understand why the UF government was such a disaster. Particularly interesting is his analysis of the left parties’ motives for allying with the Bangla Congress and forming the ruling coalition.
The main reason for the clashes between the UF parties was that though they had decided to co-exist in the Government, they were against co-existence on the organisational level. They wanted not merely to grow, but to grow at the expense of their colleagues in the Front. As the most powerful constituent with control over all departments dealing with mass organisations, the CPI(M) was in a much better position than the other parties to carry out this programme. It could dole out privileges to the mass organisations through the departments concerned to prepare the ground for a take-over; it could restrain the police or, if necessary, use them to its own end at the time of the takeover.
Ghosh provides a number of interesting explanations for the UF government’s dysfunction, most ultimately stemming from deeper issues with the constituent parties’ motives and their constant clash with each other. For example, the Socialist Unity Centre’s (SUC) Subodh Banerjee was the Labor Minister in the first UF government, and his lasting ‘contribution’ to Bengal was the introduction of the gherao, a form of labor protest that did irreparable damage to the state’s economy. Ghosh cited an interesting and rather convincing explanation (initially voiced by other left parties opposed to the SUC) for Subodh Banerjee introducing a measure so damaging to his own government’s reputation:
Other left parties have alleged that the SUC encouraged gheraos because of its weakness in the labour front. It did not control big unions capable of organising strikes; in many units it was altogether non-existent. The party had to seek, therefore, a quick and easy way to spread its influence taking advantage of Banerjee’s ministership; it chose gherao as that did not require much organisation. A handful of workers claiming allegiance to the SUC could stage a gherao and through the intervention of the minister wrest some benefits from the employers. The workers, who are primarily interested in immediate benefits, would naturally be attracted towards unions capable of bringing them such easy and quick relief; they would desert their old unions for the small benefits that gheraos might bring. It is stated that the number of SUC unions went up considerably during the nine months of the first UF regime while many old established unions lost heavily in membership. With the multiplicity of unions, inter-union rivalries sharpened, and the labour movement was, on the whole, weakened by gheraos.
This book offers fantastic analysis of how greed and political rivalry created some of the UF’s worst problems, as shown above. There are also good explanations of the impact all this chaos had on law and order and the state’s economy. For example, here’s Ghosh citing the results of a study on gheraos’ effect, set up by the National Commission on Labor:
Discussing the effects of gheraos the study group reported that in most cases gheraos had left a trail of indiscipline, go-slow, or work-to-rule by workers while in others the tempo ’sought to be created as a prelude to gheraos had similar effects. Quality and quantity of products suffered; in some cases factories lost orders as they could not adhere to the production schedule or deliver goods in time. Supervisors could not discharge their normal functions. The normal industrial relations machinery of the State became ineffective. In a number of cases the Labour Minister himself intervened, but there were instances where workers refused to accept his advice and persisted in their coercive tactics. There were cases where the management staff were subjected to harassments, gheraos, and even assault while coming out of conciliation meetings. In some places workers were able to extract concessions from the management. But gheraos led to closure of a number of small establishments and lockouts rendering a large number of workers unemployed. It was estimated that the number of persons rendered unemployed went up approximately to 80,000 by the end of September; however, in the beginning of October some mills resumed working. Gheraos resorted to by workers in some places also stiffened the attitude of the management who might have otherwise settled the disputes on a reasonable basis.
I’m quoting extensively from the book because I think these excerpts offer a good glimpse of the kind of powerful analysis it offers. If you want to learn about the UF government, this is a top-tier book: entertaining, informative, and well-written.
In addition to being a good history book, “The Disinherited State” is useful in its capacity to help us make better decisions in the present. There’s a lot of wisdom to be gained from this book, and many of the forces described in the UF government are still present today. In particular, I feel it’s important for policymakers and voters to keep in mind the continuing issue of unions’ behavior often toeing a line between legitimate protest and extortion, the tendency of the ruling party/parties to use government resources (e.g. police misuse or running patronage networks with government funds and jobs) to strengthen their political front, the issue of political defections stemming from opportunism and backdoors conniving, and the prevalence of political violence. If this book is read closely, a lot can be learnt both about the past and the present.
Closing note -- no, I didn't misspell Mr. Ghosh's first name, I have no idea why there is so little consistency in the English transliterations of Bengali names.